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When we embarked on this project to examine China’s role in the Global Industrial Meat Complex, we had intended to 
produce only one report. Fairly quickly into the research, we realized—given the complexity of China, the scale and scope 
of production and the rapid rate at which different meat segments in China are evolving—individual sectors such as feed, 
pork, dairy and poultry merited their own stories. This large endeavor could not have been achieved without the help of 
numerous people that were involved from the conception, research, drafting.  translation and editing phases of the project.
First, we’d like to thank Jim Harkness, IATP’s president for 7 years (2006–2013) as the person who conceived this project 
as a critical contribution to the debate on the expansion of industrial meat production, its increasing concentration and its 
implications for social and environmental justice. Our interviews, conducted in May 2013, in China would not have been as 
rich without Jim’s excellent contacts, his Chinese language skills and his 16 years of experience living and working in China. 
His editorial input, suggestions and revisions throughout the process have been invaluable. 
IATP is also grateful to Mindi Schneider for being the lead author of our report: China’s Pork Miracle? Agribusiness and 
Development in China’s Pork Industry. We are indebted to her for being generous with her knowledge, in-depth research and 
analysis on China’s “pork miracle,” the role of government policies and the emergence of Chinese corporations in the meat 
and feed industries. 
Several other people contributed with hours of research and writing that helped shape these reports. We thank Sophia 
Murphy, Sarah Martin and Sarah Horowitz who contributed heavily in the early stages of the project and whose research 
contributed to the content of the final reports. Assistance with translations of documents and interviews was adeptly 
provided by Jiang Tuo and Yuan Miaozhu.
Lastly, but definitely not least in the writing process, Zhang Rou and Chendong Pi spent numerous hours researching, 
writing and revising various drafts of the dairy and poultry reports, respectively. We are grateful for their hard work and 
efforts. Ben Lilliston also provided important editorial input throughout the process and IATP’s communications team 
worked around the clock to deliver a beautiful final product.
In addition, we thank experts like Fred Gale, Mia MacDonald (Brighter Green), Susanne Gura, Kees Kodde (Greenpeace 
China) and Third World Network who generously shared their research and analysis of China’s meat revolution with us. We 
also thank the researchers, academics, representatives of the industry and Chinese policymakers who were interviewed 
anonymously in China as part of this research. Any factual errors are our own responsibility and not of these individuals. 
We especially thank the Grace Foundation for supporting this project and understanding the importance of researching the 
global dimensions of the industrial meat complex and why China was a good place to start.
A final caveat: The project has been an enormously enriching process of learning about how China is grappling with its 
choices to consume and produce more meat and what this means for social and environmental issues within and outside 
China. It is by no means intended to be a definitive account—an impossible task for a country as complex and vast as China. 
We hope however, that it will be an important contribution to an evolving debate and process.
–Shefali Sharma
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THE GLOBA L INDUSTRI A L 
ME AT COMPLEX: 
UNDERSTA NDING CHINA’S 
ME AT RE VOLU TION
When the Chinese company Shuanghui International 
Holdings announced its intention to purchase Smithfield 
Foods, it got the attention of the U.S. Congress and the 
media. The idea of a foreign firm owning a giant U.S. pork 
producer, and an influential player in the U.S. food system, 
raised a government debate about the links between food 
security and national security.1 The purchase was just the 
latest in the growing consolidation in the global indus-
trial meat complex—where long supply chains include feed 
production, genetics and breeding span the globe and blur 
national identity. Shuanghui’s recent name change to WH 
Group Limited exemplifies this global branding and reach.2
Aside from operating in the U.S., the global meat industry 
is increasingly interlinked with emerging economies. 
China and Brazil are now not only big agricultural 
producers and consumers, they have spawned a new 
set of agribusinesses, shaping the global meat complex. 
Their governments have embraced the factory-style meat 
production promoted by U.S. agribusiness companies. 
They are also adopting Western diets, including rising 
meat consumption.
In 2013, the U.S. was the top global importer of beef, 
and top exporter of pork; Brazil was the top exporter of 
beef and poultry. China is the world’s largest producer 
and consumer of pork, the second largest producer of 
poultry and the world’s largest soybean (for animal feed) 
importer. Brazil is increasingly filling the global need for 
meat, while the U.S. and Brazil compete for China’s soy 
market. With the purchase of Smithfield, Shuanghui/
WH Group becomes the largest pork enterprise in the 
world. Brazilian based JBS is now the world’s largest meat 
company. U.S.-based Tyson remains one of the world’s 
largest poultry companies, competing with JBS’s acquisi-
tions in the poultry industry. In short, industrialized meat 
production, processing and consumption has truly become 
a global phenomenon with global implications. 
U.S.-based corporations, and their model of industrial 
animal production, have certainly been a major catalyst in 
the growth of industrial meat production around the world. 
Over the last 50 years, the rise of industrial meat produc-
tion in the U.S. has been nothing short of astounding. 
Animal production has shifted from a decentralized 
family farm system to a more concentrated system with 
fewer companies producing and large numbers of animals 
in confined spaces. These operations standardized feed for 
weight gain, genetic selection and the mechanization of 
feeding and watering.  
Six years ago, a commission sponsored by the Pew Founda-
tion examined the industrial meat production in the United 
States The Pew Commission issued a series of recommen-
dations, including the phase out of non-therapeutic use of 
antibiotics in animal production, stronger regulations to 
manage waste, the shift away from intensive confinement 
toward more humane treatment, vigorous enforcement of 
antitrust laws and increased funding for public research 
on alternative approaches for animal production. “Failure 
to address these issues will only result in a further lack of 
confidence in the animal agriculture industry, increased 
environmental damage, worsening public health, dismal 
animal welfare, and a grave outlook for rural communi-
ties,” concluded the commission.3
For the U.S. farm economy, the industrial meat system 
has pushed out nearly all independent poultry and pork 
producers, while independent beef producers continue to 
hang on against all odds. Over 13 years ago, IATP docu-
mented the transformation of U.S. hog production in The 
Price We Pay for Corporate Hogs. In a period of 30 years 
(1950–1980), the number of U.S. hog farms declined by 
nearly 80 percent, while the average farm size increased 
six-fold. By 1999, 50 percent or more of the farmers were 
under some sort of contractual arrangement and four 
companies (including Smithfield) controlled 20 percent 
of the production. In the last decade, this process has only 
further intensified. By 2007, four companies controlled 66 
percent of the production—at a great cost to U.S. farmers, 
consumers, the environment and public health. Further, 
working conditions at industrial meat processing facilities 
are considered some of the most dangerous in the U.S.4 
In response to the numerous problems associated with 
industrial meat production in the U.S., rural communi-
ties, farm groups, environmental and public health orga-
nizations around the country have opposed the industrial 
meat system on a number of different fronts, in many 
cases winning important battles. But while U.S. meat 
consumption per capita has declined over the last four 
years,5 U.S. meat production continues to rise, linked to 
increasing U.S. meat exports. There are clear lessons to be 
learned from the U.S. experience.
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Like most agricultural commodities, the meat industry is 
not local, regional or national—it is global. And the multi-
national companies that dominate this industry, from 
production to feed to processing and distribution, are set 
on exporting this industrial model of production around 
the globe. The industry is aided by trade agreements that 
threaten to lower worker safety, health and environmental 
standards while further empowering the legal standing of 
corporations to challenge national regulations. 
It is becoming increasingly clear that addressing the 
economic, environmental and health downsides of the 
global industrial meat system will have to include an 
international dimension. Certainly, the health threats 
associated with industrial meat production—avian influ-
enza, Mad Cow disease, H1N1 (swine flu), antibiotic-
resistant bacteria, melamine poisoning—do not recognize 
national boundaries. 
Will countries such as China, Brazil and India continue 
down the same path of the U.S. on industrializing their 
meat production? Or, is a different path possible? 
In this first phase of our research on the global industrial 
meat complex, we examine the role of China. We look in 
depth at four sectors within China associated with animal 
production: feed, pork, dairy and poultry. It is an endeavor 
to understand and share how China’s transformation 
towards a U.S. agribusiness model is both a common story 
of industrial meat production anywhere but is also specific 
to China. Further, it is an attempt to show how China’s 
story, like the U.S.’s, is a global one, with global links and 
global impacts.
Understanding how Chinese companies are “going out” to 
develop their supply chains and how major U.S. and other 
international livestock and dairy companies are “going in” 
to China better prepares us to address the global nature 
of this industrial complex and its impacts—domestic and 
global. It can help us to get beyond big headlines in the 
paper about China’s growing meat consumption and dig 
deeper into how and why it is taking place and imagine 
a different pathway towards fairness, nutrition, public 
health, environmental protection in food production—
lessons that are readily available from the U.S. experience. 
The global trend points to ever greater consolidation of 
fewer and more powerful corporations controlling scarcer 
water and land resources to feed millions of animals in 
confined spaces to produce more cheap meat. How citizens 
and governments deal with the externalities of this sector 
and its endemic global ramifications merit careful thought. 
China—as the largest producer of pork, the second largest 
producer of poultry, the largest feed importer in the world 
and the fourth largest dairy producer—is a critical piece of 
this global puzzle.
Endnotes
1. IATP, Food and national security: The Shuanhui-Smithfield merger 
revisited, September 12, 2013, http://www.iatp.org/blog/201309/
food-and-national-security-the-shuanghui-smithfield-merger-revisited.
2. Wattagnet, 2014. Shuanghui International changes name to WH Group: 
New corporate name manifests company’s emerging global reach and aspirations 
as a world-leading brand, http://www.wattagnet.com/166126.html (accessed 
January 24, 2014).
3. Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production, http://www.ncifap.
org. 
4. Human Rights Watch “Abuses Against Workers Taint U.S. Meat 
and Poultry,” January 25, 2005, http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/01/24/
abuses-against-workers-taint-us-meat-and-poultry. 
5. Elaine Watson, “Is the decline in US meat consumption terminal?”, April 
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EX ECU TI V E SUMM A RY
Agriculture has helped fuel the “China miracle.”  Since 
1978, agricultural and food output has soared, Chinese 
agribusiness firms have become key players in domestic 
and international markets, and by all accounts, China has 
been highly successful in overcoming land and resource 
constraints to feed its population of 1.3 billion people. The 
country is celebrated for its successes in reducing poverty 
and hunger over the last 30 years, and more recently, for 
creating an agrifood system that makes eating “high on 
the hog” a possibility and reality for many Chinese people.
Pork is at the heart of this miracle. A hallmark of the post-
1978 agricultural development model is ramping up the 
production, sale, and consumption of meat. Processed and 
packaged meats are the fastest growing market segments, 
reflecting the increasing influence and operation of pork 
processors, and the more general trend towards processed 
foods that can be shipped, stored, and sold with a longer 
shelf-life in super- and hyper-markets. These trends 
are also reflected in the Shuanghui (now called the WH 
Group to take on a more international identity) buyout of 
Smithfield Foods, a move that will increase China’s pork 
supplies, strengthen Shuanghui’s brand within China as 
“safer” meat with higher consumer status because of its US 
origin, and further generate and shape consumer demand 
for industrial pork. The Shuanghui-Smithfield deal is a 
matter of political and economic interest, but also signals a 
much more basic insight: pork, and the systems and actors 
that produce it, are central in China’s agrifood system with 
increasingly global inter-linkages and implications. 
Government officials support increased pork produc-
tion and consumption through subsidies, investments, 
and favorable policies for medium- to large-scale indus-
trial operations. Agribusiness firms control much of the 
production and sale of meat (and agricultural products 
more generally), often through production arrangements 
with commercial farmers, and with financial support 
from public and private investment. Smallholder farmers 
either opt out of pig production in the context of increasing 
consolidation of the industry, become specialized hog 
producers, or are transformed into waged, typically 
migrant, laborers. And consumers eat more pork than 
ever before, with wealthier eaters preferring industrially 
produced meat, which is viewed as more strictly regu-
lated, and therefore, safer.
Yet, food safety, public health problems and environmental 
pollution associated with the sector are also increas-
ingly becoming bottlenecks--evident in the starkly vivid 
images of dead pigs floating in a river near Shanghai 
earlier in 2013. This dialectic between pork’s socio-polit-
ical importance in China and its mounting externalities 
will shape Chinese policy towards pork production, trade 
and consumer choices in the coming decade.
This report builds on Mindi Schneider’s 2011 IATP report, 
Feeding China’s Pigs: Implications for the Environment, China’s 
Smallholder Farmers and Food Security. It addresses the 
question of how and why China’s animal husbandry sector 
has shifted towards increasingly industrialized meat 
production, which in many ways replicates the dominant 
and unsustainable U.S. model, but at an even larger scale. 
The analysis reveals and describes an interrelated set of 
drivers, both state-led and otherwise, that have increased 
industrial meat production and consumption in China 
throughout the reform era. 
Section II provides a synopsis of pork industry develop-
ment in China, including a historical overview of pork 
production, a summary of reform era policies, produc-
tion and consumption trends, and an analysis of current 
and continuing restructuring, including some Chinese 
perspectives on the Shuanghui-Smithfield deal. Section 
III examines some of the motivations that underlie swine 
sector industrialization, including the politics of govern-
ment production goals and food safety, and how these 
drivers play a role in the construction of consumer demand. 
Section IV examines some of the key actors, ideas, and 
mechanisms of pork development. It details leading 
agribusiness firms called Dragon Head Enterprises, and 
the Chinese versions of vertical integration and contract 
farming. Analysis in this section reveals that ownership 
and operation in China’s pork industry is largely domestic, 
but based on logics and practices common to agribusiness-
led industrial production everywhere. Section V discusses 
the presence of foreign firms in China’s pork industry, 
serving as a trace on global consolidation as it touches down 
in China, and as China simultaneously begins to change 
the dynamics of consolidation. The last section addresses 
some of the impacts of this industrial mode of livestock 
production, which Chinese officials and agribusiness seem 
to have embraced whole-heartedly. It describes some of 
the challenges the U.S.—as the originator of the model—is 
facing in public health and environmental pollution today, 
relating them to development in China with the hope that 
these issues can be faced and effectively confronted.   
10 INSTITUTE FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADE POLICY
This report has shown that in a system that was decen-
tralized in the late 1970s and early 1980s, state support 
has made Dragon Head Enterprises (a government status 
bestowed upon private or public companies that meet a 
set of criteria for agriculture development) the leaders 
in producing, selling, and profiting from pork and agri-
cultural products more generally. As these firms are 
becoming increasingly capitalized and invested, they are 
also becoming increasingly powerful in global agrifood 
markets. The Shuanghui acquisition of Smithfield Foods 
is but one example of this phenomenon; it is a profound 
example given the scale of the deal and the media atten-
tion it has garnered, but it is by no means an isolated 
incident. The central government adopted a set of policies 
in 2000 to encourage Chinese state and private firms to 
invest in operations and infrastructure abroad. This “go 
out” (zou chuqu) strategy continues today, and is related 
to new forms of global consolidation in the pork industry, 
as well as to China’s much-reported land grabs (see IATP’s 
The Need for Feed: China’s Demand for Industrialized Meat and 
Its Impact in this series). Firms like Beidahuang, COFCO 
(the China National Cereals, Oils, and Feedstuffs Corpo-
ration), the Chongqing Grain Group, the New Hope Group, 
the China National Agricultural Development Group, and 
others have all “gone out” for land, agricultural resources, 
and/or other companies abroad.
The pork industry in China is massive, as are its implica-
tions for soil and water pollution, climate change, public 
health, and rural livelihoods. But the industry in China 
is in many ways the industry in the US and elsewhere, a 
fact that analyses and policies need to take into account. 
Critiques of China’s pork miracle must also be critiques of 
the practices and structures of industrial livestock agricul-
ture on the whole. At the same time, as Chinese domestic 
firms play ever more important roles in global markets, 
it seems likely that agribusiness politics in the future, 
both in China and on the world stage, will be increas-
ingly Dragon-Headed. Understanding what is general and 
what is particular, and how the two influence one another, 
is crucial for understanding the rise of agribusiness with 
Chinese characteristics. It is also necessary for framing and 
implementing more just, sustainable, and diverse agrifood 
systems that can reverse the damages wrought by decades 
of global agricultural industrialization. This, surely, is our 
most pressing task.
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I .  IN TRODUCTION: 
CHINA’S PORK MIR ACLE?
Agriculture has helped fuel the “China miracle.” Since 
1978, agricultural and food output has soared, Chinese 
agribusiness firms have become key players in domestic 
and international markets, and by all accounts, China has 
been highly successful in overcoming land and resource 
constraints to feed its population of 1.3 billion people. The 
country is celebrated for its successes in reducing poverty 
and hunger over the last 30 years, and more recently, for 
creating an agrifood system that makes eating “high on the 
hog” a possibility and reality for many Chinese people. From 
the food shortages and famines of the mid-20th century, to 
the proliferation of calories and food options in the present-
day, China’s miracle is in many ways a food miracle.
Pork is at the heart of this miracle. A hallmark of the 
post-1978 agricultural development model is ramping 
up the production, sale and consumption of meat. Since 
1980, average per capita meat consumption in China has 
quadrupled, such that in 2009, the average person ate 128 
pounds (58 kg) of meat.1 Processed and packaged meats 
are the fastest growing market segments, reflecting the 
increasing influence and operation of pork processors, and 
the more general trend towards processed foods that can 
be shipped, stored and sold with a longer shelf-life in super- 
and hyper-markets. These trends are also reflected in the 
Shuanghui (in English, “Shineway”) buyout of Smithfield 
Foods, a move that will increase China’s pork supplies, 
strengthen Shuanghui’s brand within China (as “safer” 
meat with higher consumer status because of its U.S. 
origin), and further generate and shape consumer demand 
for industrial pork. The Shuanghui-Smithfield deal is a 
matter of political and economic interest, but also signals a 
much more basic insight: pork, and the systems and actors 
that produce it, are central in China’s agrifood system with 
increasingly global inter-linkages and implications. 
Government officials support increased pork produc-
tion and consumption through subsidies, investments 
and favorable policies for medium- to large-scale indus-
trial operations. Agribusiness firms control much of the 
production and sale of meat (and agricultural products 
more generally), often through production arrangements 
with commercial farmers, and with financial support from 
public and private investment. Smallholder farmers either 
opt out of pig production in the context of increasing consol-
idation of the industry, become specialized hog producers, 
or are transformed into waged, typically migrant, laborers. 
Consumers eat more pork than ever before, with wealthier 
eaters preferring industrially produced meat, which is 
viewed as more strictly regulated, and therefore, safer. 
Pork is available today in greater volumes, and in a wider 
variety than ever before. It is a capital- and resource-
intensive sector that has become highly productive, highly 
profitable, and is held up in policy and commerce circles as 
a paragon of modern agricultural development. Yet, food 
safety, public health problems and environmental pollution 
associated with the sector are also increasingly becoming 
bottlenecks—evident in the starkly vivid images of dead 
pigs floating in a river near Shanghai earlier in 2013. This 
dialectic between pork’s sociopolitical importance in China 
and its mounting externalities will shape Chinese policy 
towards pork production, trade and consumer choices in 
the coming decade.
While both Chinese and foreign investors are chomping 
at the bit to get in on “China’s pork miracle,” a number of 
questions remain about the country’s demand for pork, and 
how it will be satisfied: How much will China’s appetite for 
pork continue to grow? How much of its demand will be 
met from imports and how much meat as opposed to animal 
feed imports? Will Chinese firms continue buying foreign 
companies and investing in foreign land and infrastructure 
to satisfy domestic processors and consumers? Can the 
world produce enough feed for ever-increasing numbers of 
industrial swine in China without impacting global food 
security? Can it produce enough meat to satisfy China’s 
demand? Can China’s scarce land and water resources 
handle the onslaught of billions more tons of untreated 
manure flowing from more and more mega pig farms and 
afford the mounting public health costs related to antibi-
otic overuse in its production? Will increasing consumer 
concerns about food safety eventually create a funda-
mental shift away from industrial meat production toward 
more healthy and ecologically sustainable practices?
This report builds on Mindi Schneider’s 2011 IATP report, 
Feeding China’s Pigs: Implications for the Environment, China’s 
Smallholder Farmers and Food Security.2 It addresses the 
question of how and why China’s animal husbandry sector 
has shifted toward increasingly industrialized meat 
production, which in many ways replicates the dominant 
and unsustainable U.S. model, but at an even larger scale. 
The analysis reveals and describes an interrelated set of 
drivers, both state-led and otherwise, that have increased 
industrial meat production and consumption in China 
throughout the reform era. 
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The report is not intended to definitively answer all of the 
questions posed in this introductory section, nor does it 
aim to outline or resolve all of the challenges of industrial 
livestock production. Our intent is to provide a framework 
for understanding and acting on these challenges, through 
a deeper analysis of how the pork sector has developed 
and is currently changing in China, and the key policies, 
players and dynamics that are shaping its future direction. 
Section II provides a synopsis of pork industry develop-
ment in China, including a historical overview of pork 
production, a summary of reform-era policies, produc-
tion and consumption trends, and an analysis of current 
and continuing restructuring, including some Chinese 
perspectives on the Shuanghui-Smithfield deal. Section 
III examines some of the motivations that underlie swine 
sector industrialization, including the politics of govern-
ment production goals and food safety, and how these 
drivers play a role in the construction of consumer demand. 
Section IV examines some of the key actors, ideas, and 
mechanisms of pork development. It details leading 
agribusiness firms called Dragon Head Enterprises, and 
the Chinese versions of vertical integration and contract 
farming. Analysis in this section reveals that ownership 
and operation in China’s pork industry is largely domestic, 
but based on logics and practices common to agribusiness-
led industrial production everywhere. Section V discusses 
the presence of foreign firms in China’s pork industry, 
serving as a trace on global consolidation as it touches down 
in China, and as China simultaneously begins to change 
the dynamics of consolidation. The last section addresses 
some of the impacts of this industrial mode of livestock 
production, which Chinese officials and agribusiness seem 
to have embraced whole-heartedly. It describes some of 
the challenges the U.S.—as the originator of the model—is 
facing in public health and environmental pollution today, 
relating them to development in China with the hope that 
these issues can be faced and effectively confronted. 
II .  DE V ELOPING CHINA’S 
PORK INDUSTRY
As China’s leading meat category in terms of popularity, 
production and consumption, pork is at the center of the 
country’s animal husbandry sector. At the same time, 
because the processes of industrialization in China’s 
other livestock sectors (chicken, dairy, beef and aqua-
culture) share similar goals, logics and actors, analyzing 
pork provides a lens on the trajectory of China’s livestock 
industry more broadly. This is not to say that each live-
stock sector is identical; rather, pork is a representative 
case of China’s industrial meat boom, and it is the sector 
with the most pressing environmental and social implica-
tions to date.
All the pork in China: a brief 
historical overview 
While meat, and especially pork, has been a part of agricul-
tural and food traditions in China for thousands of years, 
it was peripheral in diets until very recently. For most of 
history, and for most Chinese people, eating meat was 
limited to social and ceremonial events, never produced 
in quantities that would allow routine consumption for 
the entire population. Before 1949, Chinese farmers (the 
vast majority of the population at the time) received only 
one percent of their food energy from animal products, 
while grains made up the bulk of their diets.3 The situation 
today has changed dramatically: livestock production is 
skyrocketing, meat consumption is increasing across the 
board, and for urban middle- and upper-class consumers 
in particular, meat is moving steadily to the center of the 
dinner plate, and to the center of modern diets. 
These 21st-century agricultural and dietary changes 
represent radical departures from most of China’s history. 
Starting 6,000 to 10,000 years ago, when pigs were 
domesticated in various parts of China, each place had its 
own locally adapted pig breed, and most households raised 
at least one or two pigs each year.4 Pigs were more valuable 
alive than dead, acting as efficient converters of kitchen 
and agricultural scraps into nutrient-rich fertilizer, before 
becoming pork that could be given as a wedding gift, used 
to curry political or social favor, or eaten as part of Chinese 
New Year celebrations.5
Pigs were a staple of Chinese farming systems and house-
holds, while for the vast majority of people, pork was a rare 
treat. Although this long tradition of pork consumption 
in China includes variation across different times, places 
and social relations, the smallholder model of raising pigs 
as part of diverse crop and livestock agroecosystems, 
coupled with only occasional meat eating, defines much of 
the country’s 7,000 years of agricultural history.
The sweeping political and social changes in China since 
the People’s Republic was established in 1949 in turn 
changed the ways meat was produced, sold and eaten. 
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Perhaps the most profound changes have occurred in the 
wake of Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening” in 1978, 
which launched the idea of “Socialism with Chinese Char-
acteristics”.6 The reforms loosened central control over 
agricultural production and distribution, increased state 
purchase prices for grain and re-introduced the possibility 
for farmers to keep and sell some of their surplus through 
private markets. The Chinese government also invested 
heavily in (and subsidized) chemical fertilizers, pesticides, 
irrigation and high-yielding seed varieties—China’s green 
revolution. As agriculture boomed and incomes rose, 
markets became more and more central to the distribution 
of social goods such as food which had primarily been allo-
cated by collective institutions. Pork became a commodity 
and agribusiness was opened as a new site for investment 
and profit. 
It should be noted that the extreme corporate concentra-
tion and industrialization of pig production is a relatively 
recent phenomenon globally. In the United States, home 
of the industrial livestock model that is world-dominant 
today, the number of hog farms dropped by 70 percent from 
1991 to 2009.7 Contract farming increased dramatically in 
just 12 years—from five percent in 1992 to 67 percent by 
2004.8 U.S. farms started specializing in a single phase 
of production with “greater reliance on purchased rather 
than homegrown feed” as independent family farms gave 
way to industrial large-scale producers tied in an exploit-
ative contractual relationship to a few meat packing 
companies.9 The average hog farm grew from 945 head in 
1992 to 8,389 by 2009, though confined animal farm opera-
tions (CAFOs) started developing in the 50s in the country. 
In China, too, the speed and scale of change has been 
phenomenal, conditioned by policies, investments and the 
transforming economic system. However, unlike the U.S., 
the sheer number of farmers in China has meant that the 
transition from small backyard farms to mega-industrial 
farms was slow in the 80s and 90s and rapidly acceler-
ated in 2006 after the government made factory farms a 
priority to solve food safety problems (see next sections). 
Thousands of small producers are still in the process of 
exiting the sector today. 
Moreover, whereas in the U.S., only four major meat-
packers control the terms of trade. China has many domes-
tically supported companies, though the sector is rapidly 
becoming more concentrated. The U.S. model has heavily 
influenced China’s model, however and pork industries 
in both countries drive the distribution of global feed 
resources and add to the social, environmental and health 
problems endemic to this mode of production. Yet, China’s 
story is both particular and general.
Industrializing pork
Throughout the reform era (post-1978), industrialization 
of the swine sector proceeded at a rapid pace, with larger-
scale specialized and commercial farms displacing small-
holder farmers, and to a considerable degree, replacing 
household self-provisioning with markets. This happened 
in three broad stages. The first push to industrialize came 
in the wake of Reform and Opening, when agribusi-
ness firms emerged, import restrictions were relaxed or 
removed, and market logics began to replace state plan-
ning. One result was that the rise of commercial animal 
feed in 1980s meant that raising pigs was no longer depen-
dent on on-farm resources. Another was the scaling up, 
industrialization and commercialization of pig and pork 
production.
The next phase began in the mid-1990s, when the Chinese 
government was negotiating the country’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). In order to meet WTO 
protocols, and to increase pork production and consump-
tion, the state cut tariffs on soybean imports for use in 
livestock feed, effectively bypassing the country’s land 
and demographic challenges that might otherwise limit 
pork production.10 This move was crucial to the emergence 
of industrial livestock feeding (see IATP’s The Need for 
Feed: China’s Demand for Industrialized Meat and Its Impacts 
for more details). Finally, the most intensified and recent 
phase of industrialization began in 2006. In that year, 
an outbreak of “blue ear pig disease,” or porcine repro-
ductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRS), swept 
through the country, and pork prices sky rocketed. The 
government responded with measures to increase state 
support for large-scale, industrialized, and standardized 
pork production as a way to address food safety concerns, 
stabilize the industry and protect against future shocks.11 
The impact of these developments on consumer demand is 
discussed in more detail below.
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Pork industry production, 
consumption and imports 
In terms of global meat production, pork is the world 
leader and its largest market is in China. Currently, half 
of all pigs on the planet are raised and eaten in China. In 
2012, Chinese farmers and companies produced 50 million 
metric tons of pork from a domestic swineherd of 660 
million head. This was twice the amount of pork produced 
in all 27 European Union countries combined, and five 
times the amount in the United States. 
Growth will continue in 2014: swine production is 
expected to reach 723 million head, pork production is 
expected to increase by two percent to 54.7 million tons, 
and consumption expected to rise to 55 million tons.12 
In the longer term, the OECD-FAO predict that China’s 
total meat production will reach 93 million tons in the 
next decade, premised on a 1.5 percent annual increase 
from 2013 to 2022.13 While this expansion is still massive, 
it is actually a decrease from the 2.3 percent annual 
growth boom in the previous decade. Pork production in 
particular is projected to increase 1.6 percent annually, 
with poultry growth at 1.9 percent and beef at 1.7 percent. 
Despite these other meat categories keeping pace and 
surpassing the growth rate of pork production, pork will 
continue to account for the largest share of production 
(in retail weight) at 63 percent, compared to 25 percent 
poultry and 7 percent beef in 2022.14 The OECD-FAO also 
predict that Chinese consumption growth of all meats 
sectors will mirror their production. Pork is expected to 
capture 66 percent of additional consumption, despite the 
forecast that poultry meat will experience the fastest rate 
of increase (see also IATP’s Fair or Fowl? Industrialization of 
Poultry Production in China). In short, pork will continue to 
dominate production and consumption overall.
While all agree that the general direction of production 
is increasing, precise estimates vary amongst experts: 
Rabobank, for instance, predicts that China’s total pork 
production will reach 60 million tons by 2020.15
Reproduced from Rabobank 2012. Industrialization of China’s Pork Supply 
Chain: Finding the Best Business Model. Industry Note # 329—September, 
pg. 4.
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On a per-person basis, the Chinese consume an average of 
39 kg of pork a year, compared to 27 kg in the U.S.16 Virtu-
ally all of this production is from pig farms inside China: 
domestic consumption matches production, and pork 
imports and exports are currently negligible relative to 
China’s overall production. China’s per capita pork 
consumption is projected to be 10 kg higher than OECD’s 
annually by 2022.17  But these estimates aren’t set in stone. 
It should be noted that food safety scares can dramatically 
affect demand for meat in China (see section on food safety 
below), and these concerns will affect production policies 
and consumption trends in the coming decades. 
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Figure 2: Pork Consumption Per Person in China and the 
United States, 1960-2012
Reproduced from Earth Policy Institute; hp://www.earth-policy.org/
datacenter/xls/update102_8.xlsx
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Figure 3: Meat Consumption Per Person in China and the 
United States, 2012
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Imports
“Negligible” imports in China’s pork sector can translate 
into sizable exports from the world market, especially 
when Hong Kong is included in the equation. From 2000 
to 2006, China and Hong Kong together imported between 
500,000 to 600,000 metric tons of pork, though this figure 
was less than one percent of consumption.19 In 2014, China 
is expected to import 775,000 tons of pork20 from a world 
market with a little more than 7 million export tons.21 This 
equates to a little over one percent of domestic consump-
tion, but close to 12 percent of the world’s exports. 
Note: Data include fresh, chilled and frozen pork; sausage casings; oal; and 
processed pork products (Harmonzied System codes 0203, 020630, 020641,
020649, 0210, 0504, 160241, 160242, 160249)
Reproduced from  Gale, F et al 2012. China’s Volatile Pork Industry. 
USDA ERS, February, pg. 3
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Figure 4: China and Hong Kong have become a larger market
for pork imports
China and Hong Kong pork imports from U.S.
China and Hong Kong pork imports from other countries
Food safety issues are largely driving China’s pork sourcing 
decisions. Since 2007, China has been the primary export 
destination for the U.S. pork industry. During the coun-
try’s peak pork import year in 2008, U.S. sales to China-
Hong Kong accounted for 18 percent of U.S. pork exports, 
which was double the share from 2000 to 2006.22 But in the 
first half of 2013, Germany overtook the U.S. as China’s top 
pork importer, with U.S. market share dropping from 48 
to 18 percent and Germany’s rising to 23 percent.23 Germa-
ny’s ability to provide ractopamine-free pork at a cheaper 
price (see section on food safety) seems to make it a more 
competitive exporter. 
Pork imports are one part of the story, and pig imports are 
another. According to Morgan Stanley 2011, China is the 
world’s third largest importer of live hogs. As the sector 
is increasingly industrialized, in addition to CAFO build-
ings and technologies, it also needs pig breeds that have 
been developed to thrive in these conditions. Importing 
breeding stock in the form of live hogs has been a common 
method for genetically transforming the country’s swine 
herd. In 2014, the country’s hog imports are expected to 
increase by 10 percent to 22,000 animals.24 The U.S. is 
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China’s largest live swine supplier, accounting for half of 
the market. Canada supplies 20 to 30 percent of pigs, and 
the remainder comes from the EU.25
China’s major live swine and pork export destination is 
Hong Kong, with China exporting 1.8 million head to 
Hong Kong and Macau in 2014.26 
Import Prospects
Reported volatility in China’s pork market has exporters 
enthusiastic about their prospects for gaining market 
share. This was most evident following the outbreak 
of PRRS in 2006, when pork supplies and prices became 
unstable, prompting increased imports the following 
year. As feed and labor prices in China continue to rise, 
exporters hope that the high cost of domestic production 
will open further opportunities for imports to fill in with 
pork produced abroad. The U.S. hog industry in particular 
reacts strongly to any changes in the Chinese market: an 
announcement to remove the ban on U.S. hog imports 
to China resulted in a three month high for U.S. lean hog 
prices in 2009.27
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Figure 5: China monthly pork imports vary with 
domestic hog price
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Reproduced from  Gale, F et al 2012, pg. 4
The nature of pork imports into China gives an indica-
tion of how companies view the market currently, and in 
the future. A large proportion of meat imports are either 
high-end packaged meat products, fresh offal (organ 
meats), or other variety meats.28 Because Chinese food 
culture includes dishes that use liver, kidney, stomach, 
spleen, feet and other body parts, China is seen as a 
profitable destination for the byproducts of global meat 
processing companies; meat has been the primary 
slaughter product, sold in consumer markets in the global 
North.
Reproduced from Rabobank, 2012, pg. 17. 
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Figure 6: China’s pork and by-product imports, 1996–2011
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Processed meat products are increasingly common in 
China, but fresh meat remains the most important part 
of the market, and of consumer preference. This too is 
related to pork imports. According to Rabobank, factories, 
schools, institutions and further processors are the main 
market for imported pork in China. Given rising costs 
of production, in some cases it may be cheaper for these 
entities to import frozen pork than to buy domestic fresh 
meat.29 Mainly used by small processing companies, some 
frozen pork also flows into retail and wholesale chan-
nels. Offal, on the other hand, typically goes directly into 
wholesale and food service. Imports of offal are projected 
to increase in the coming years, but are not likely to domi-
nate the retail market given the strong consumer prefer-
ence for fresh meat.30
Getting global pork to market in China, and predicting 
future imports, involves a number of considerations. 
First, China has no import quotas on pork, but it does 
require bilateral agreements for trade. Overseas plants 
must get approval through China’s General Administra-
tion of Quality, Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ).31 Second, factors that impact pork price—such as 
supply, disease epidemics, feed costs, labor costs and poli-
cies—will combine with changing consumer demand and 
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Box 1: The Shuanghui-Smithfield 
Merger: Views from China
In May-June 2013, just as news about the possible merger 
broke, IATP interviewed various experts in Beijing including 
representatives from Chinese research institutes, the feed 
and pork industries and policymakers. They had wide 
perspectives on the merger: 
Feed industry expert:
As a fast growing Chinese company, they (Shuanghui) 
could learn advanced management skills and technology 
(food processing, breeding management) from abroad 
to improve their competitiveness. By acquiring a foreign 
firm, Shuanghui could quickly and soundly achieve 
its goal: going global…So I think it is a good trial, even 
though there might be some challenges in management 
due to the cultural difference.  
It is cheaper to raise hogs in the U.S., but processing, 
marketing and sales costs are high. China could import 
whole (slaughtered) hogs and process here. It should 
not import processed pork products.
Food security and agriculture expert:
The Smithfield deal is a big mistake. Better to invest 
$7.1 billion improving the meat industry domestically. 
International meat trade is very high risk and world trade 
won’t meet Chinese demand. It would be amazing to 
me if U.S. imports met five percent of China’s demand.
Policymaker:
The benefit of importing meat is that we can import less 
grains, animal feeds and soy beans. Then the interest 
of the soy bean farmers and grain farmers will not be 
damaged. The second is the pressure of environment 
protection. I do not know whether you have been to the 
villages in China. Many rivers in the villages have been 
polluted, mainly by animal husbandry. The pollutions 
mainly come from pig and chicken raising. Why do 
we have to keep polluting the environment? So I think 
importing meat is better than importing grains. And in 
China, the mode of animal husbandry is adopted from 
the U.S.. This is not good. We used to use traditional 
raising mode. But in the recent 20 years we used the 
feed recipe from the U.S. In Liaoning, there are huge pig 
farms with millions of pigs. It is not suitable for China. 
So the big pig farms and cow farms all use American 
mode. I am concerned about such situation. It is not 
sustainable. The [feed] recipe, breeder and facilities all 
come from the U.S. But in China, we do not have so 
much feed, technology and we have bigger pressures 
on environment protection. The U.S. has a vast territory 
with a sparse population, but China has so many people.
Meat industry expert:
The operation of Smithfield in the U.S. is very difficult. 
This is a worldwide problem. The operation of 
companies in butchering industry and animal husbandry 
is very difficult in the U.S. and Europe currently, which is 
mainly due to the shrinking of consumption. 
Also, Americans and Europeans do not like hog meat. 
So Smithfield is having a hard time. Smithfield has 
liabilities of 2.4 billion dollars (sic). Similarly, Hormel 
and Agfeed are also in their hardest time. I think there 
might be two reasons for Shuanghui to purchase 
Smithfield at this very moment. First, Shuanghui is a 
Chinese company who wants to extend its business 
to the world. It feels good to take in the largest pork 
producer and processors in the world. Moreover, 
Shuanghui does not need to purchase Smithfield with 
its own money. Shuanghui only needs to pay a small 
part, and the rest of the money comes from other 
funds. Second, Shuanghui wants to transport American 
pork to China and sell in China because American pork 
is cheaper and Shuanghui can make profits from it. But 
Shuanghui forgets to take the eating habits of Chinese 
people into consideration. The traditional eating habits 
of Chinese people cannot be altered in a short time. 
Chinese people like fresh meat, Americans like frozen 
meat. The meat can only be transported from the U.S. 
to China after being frozen.
But the thinking amongst policymakers now is, ‘Now 
we want to leave the disease and pollution in U.S., and 
take the meat.’ It is not a written policy, but they have 
this way of thinking. It hasn’t been said openly, but 
it’s understood, because of pollution, land shortage, 
disease issues.”
Analysis
Much has been written about the Shuanghui-Smithfield 
merger on both sides of the Pacific. In the U.S., there are 
fears about Shuanghui stealing U.S. pork processing tech-
nologies and the know-how of creating and managing a 
CAFO. However, the merger captures the trend of the global 
livestock industry and is essentially a harbinger of what is 
to come in the next years as the global livestock industry 
consolidates even further and as financial institutions and 
investment banks continue betting on commodities (grains), 
natural resources (land) and other agricultural commodi-
ties (meat) for profit. In Shuanghui’s case, Morgan Stanley 
predicted even in 201133 that Smithfield was a profitable 
venture for investors interested in Chinese pork. Morgan 
Stanley, Chinese state-owned banks, the Bank of China, 
Goldman Sachs and several other finance firms are central 
to Shuanghui buying $3 billion USD worth of Smithfield debt 
and the company itself. It’s the increasing power of these 
firms, along with an extremely concentrated global livestock 
industry that has gotten less coverage in the merger’s news, 
yet these aspects will play a key role in the way meat is 
produced within countries and moved from one part of the 
globe to another—including from within and outside China.34
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currency fluctuations to change import-export prospects 
and projections.32 Third, the increasing power of Chinese 
pork production and processing companies, their vertical 
integration and consolidation of the sector as a whole (see 
sections below), will influence the extent to which trans-
national companies can enter the market through trade 
or direct ownership. Global mergers and acquisitions, 
and the increased financialization of the world’s livestock 
industry in general and pork production in particular, will 
further complicate this issue. The high-profile Shuanghui 
purchase of Smithfield Foods is prime example of how the 
composition of the firms that control pork’s movement 
globally are likely to change in the coming years. 
Pork industry restructuring: 
Who raises China’s pigs? 
For thousands of years, smallholders produced all the pork 
in China. As recently as 1985, these so-called backyard 
farmers, (houyuanshi siyangchang) who raise fewer than 
five pigs per year in addition to crops and other livestock on 
about half an acre of land, produced at least 95 percent of the 
country’s pork. Throughout the reform era, however, the 
number of backyard farmers and their share of production 
has declined precipitously as state policies and investments 
support the industrial operations that have catapulted 
China’s pork production to its current world dominant 
position. In 2008 alone, the number of rural households 
that raise pigs dropped by 50 percent, and in some poor 
regions, only about 35 percent of households still engage in 
the practice.35 By 2009, analysts estimate that government 
policies to encourage scaled-up production after the PRRS 
epidemic in 2006 were so successful that farms raising 
more than 50 hogs a year accounted for almost 60 percent 
of total slaughter, up from less than half in 2007.36
Analysts disagree about how best to define the current 
structure of pig raising in China, primarily because the 
range of annual production is enormous: at the house-
hold end of the spectrum, smallholders raise fewer than 
10 pigs, while at the large-scale industrial end, it is not 
uncommon for massive agribusiness firms to raise and 
process 100,000 hogs annually. Exacerbating this spread 
are plans to further integrate and consolidate the pork 
chain. For instance, some firms have plans to produce as 
many as one million pigs per year on mega-farm opera-
tions.37 And COFCO, China’s largest grain trader, aims 
to also be the country’s largest pig farmer. By 2015, this 
diversified state-owned enterprise plans to produce 10 to 
15 million pigs per year, and will invest 3.5 billion RMB 
($570 million) in slaughter facilities so that it can process 
the livestock that it raises.38
In between smallholders and megafarms are so-called 
specialized household farms (zhuanyehua de jiatingshi yang-
zhichang). The general idea of the specialized household 
farm is that pig raising is a professional endeavor based on 
production for sale instead of self-consumption. Opera-
tions may be run by individual families, by small-scale 
companies, or by several backyard farmers who have come 
together to focus on pig raising more exclusively. Some 
specialized household farmers produce under contract 
with large commercial farms, while others sell piglets and 
meat pigs to local dealers who then sell pigs to slaughter, 
processing and retail firms. The government incentivizes 
the specialized household scale of production primarily 
through investments in infrastructure. 
Large-scale commercial farms (daxing shangye yang-
zhichang) are also aggressively supported by the govern-
ment, and are intended to work in concert with specialized 
household farms. These commercial farms breed, feed, 
rear, slaughter, process, and market pigs and pork. They 
do so in a variety of ways, from being specialized in one 
particular phase of production, to operating in some or 
all phases, to managing contracts with other farms and 
companies in order to produce and sell an end product. The 
annual scale of production on these farms typically ranges 
from 500 to 50,000 pigs, but is rapidly growing. Increas-
ingly, a single farm can produce hundreds of thousands of 
hogs in one year, either through contracts or in a single 
production facility. 
Many of the largest expansions stem from increased 
vertical integration (see section below) of the top Chinese 
meat processing companies into production. For instance, 
Wens produces 7 million head of swine per year. CP Group, 
Zhengbang Technology Co, Chuying Agro-Pastoral Group 
and Munyuan Food stuff Co. Ltd all have farms with more 
than 500,000 head; while COFCO Group, Shandong Liuhe 
Group and Agfeed have farms of more than 100,000 head.39 
(Agfeed in the U.S. filed for bankruptcy in June and was 
bought out by three U.S. pork producers in September.)
Rabobank 2012 notes that these mega-farms are drawing 
financial and industrial investors:
While investment flows into large-sized or mega-sized 
farms, the types of investors have diversified. Not only 
do large meat companies have interests in hog farming, 
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but private equity firms and even investors from other 
sectors, such as steel and information technology, 
could also invest millions in greenfield projects.
Commercial farms resemble, or perhaps reproduce, 
the so-called “factory farm” model that dominates pig 
production in the United States, Europe and increasingly 
in other locations around the world.40 Most commercial 
operations in China are domestic agribusiness firms, but 
transnational corporations are part of the sector in terms 
of supplying pig genetics, feed and technologies (see global 
consolidation section). Industrial facilities in China use 
the same production methods and equipment as similarly 
sized facilities elsewhere: firms purchase equipment from 
international dealers like Big Dutchman, from Chinese 
copycat companies like Big Herdsman, or from other 
Chinese firms. The Chinese model of industrial production 
is based on the U.S. model.
The current structure of China’s pork sector can be 
described as trifurcated. A study conducted by INFORMA 
Economics in conjunction with the National Grain & 
Oil Information Center in 2009 suggests that backyard 
farmers (1 to 10 pigs/year) accounted for about 27 percent 
of nationwide pork production, while specialized house-
hold producers (50 to 500 pigs/year) accounted for about 
51 percent of production, and commercial firms (> 500 
pigs/year) controlled about 22 percent. Using different 
metrics, Rabobank reports that backyard farms (1 to 
49 pigs/year) accounted for 37 percent of production in 
2010, with specialized household farms (50 to 3,000 pigs/
year) producing 51 percent and commercial farms (>3,000 
pigs/year) with only 12 percent. Although there may be 
disagreement about the numbers, the broad trend is clear: 
larger-scale operations are increasing at the expense of 
household production. While distinct edges between farm 
size categories are difficult to define, Rabobank’s special-
ized household range is too large to capture differences in 
labor, resource and environmental issues. For now, the 50 
to 500 range that INFORMA uses seems most appropriate. 
Finer scales are likely needed to adequately understand 
variance in the sector as it continues to be industrialized.
Figure 7: China: Share of total pig production by 
farm type: 1985–2007 (in percent).
Source: INFORMA
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Figure 8: Share of total pig production by farm type: 
2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 (percent). 
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Both specialized household farms and large-scale 
commercial farms can be classified as concentrated/
confined animal feeding operations or CAFOs. Though 
there has been a great variance in the way specialized 
farms operate, the government’s push to standardize 
these farms toward a specific industrial model means that 
more and more of them could be classified as CAFOs. The 
government sees CAFOs as the solution to food safety 
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problems and is thus encouraging specialized farms to 
become more factory-like in the hopes that greater bio-
exclusion and standardized methods of feeding, vaccina-
tion and rearing will reduce biosafety threats. However, 
as more and more animals get confined into the same 
space, risk of disease is also increasing.
These operations have significant fixed costs, though 
smaller-scale specialized farms can more readily take 
advantage of whatever feed is cheapest, while large-scale 
operations are locked into certain feed mixes. Increas-
ingly, however, even smaller operations are switching 
to more industrialized feed. Regardless of differences 
in scale, CAFOs in general are dependent on large-scale 
slaughter and processing facilities and both tend to be 
concentrated around the East coast and the major cities of 
the South East. As a result, pork prices tend to be higher 
in the southeastern and mideastern provinces around 
Guangzhou and Shanghai because of higher input costs in 
commercial farms.41
Backyard farms still dominate in some areas, but their 
share of the national total is slipping fast. From the grain 
the modern pigs eat (not the kitchen scraps they once 
enjoyed) to the surroundings in which they live their short 
lives (not a lone animal but one of thousands on the same 
lot), defecating such quantities as to fill whole lagoons 
before being taken to the slaughterhouse to be rendered, 
chilled, packaged and shipped out to supermarkets in 
pre-packaged cuts: everything has changed. Pig produc-
tion is expected to grow by another 20 percent in the next 
five years (BMI, 2012), fulfilling important goals in the 
government’s plans for livestock development. 
Consolidation and overcapacity 
of slaughterhouses
Given government incentives to scale up and consoli-
date the sector, large meat companies are competitively 
moving towards the north and west of the country to 
be closer to grain supplies (maize, wheat), as well as to 
establish a broader marketing network (Rabobank, 12). CP 
Group, New Hope, Wen’s and Zhengbang are all shifting in 
that direction.
Though consolidation of meat processing companies 
has been taking place since before the PRRS outbreak 
in 2006, it accelerated in 2007 as the government closed 
down many medium and small pork processors and 
slaughterhouses. The total number of “designated” 
slaughterhouses decreased from 30,000 in 2006 to 10,000 
in 2012 and expected to further decrease to 2000 by 2020.42 
Reproduced from Rabobank, 2012, pg. 8. 
Figure 9: Consolidation trends in China’s pork slaughtering 
sector, 2010 vs. 2020F 
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One result of concerted policy and financial support for 
industrializing and scaling up the pork sector is overca-
pacity in pork processing. The top three Chinese meat 
packers used less than half of their processing capacity 
in 2012. According to Rabobank, this trend indicates that 
companies are expanding much more rapidly than actual 
market development and hog farm expansion. It also 
means that there is increased competition amongst the 
top firms for sourcing hogs, another reason that Shua-
ghui’s deal with Smithfield could be lucrative, bringing 
whole carcasses from the U.S. to process in China. In spite 
of over capacity, Rabobank notes that top firms continue 
to announce further expansion plans. For instance, Yurun 
announced plans to reach 70 million head slaughtering 
capacity by 2015 and Shuanghui sought to reach 55 million 
(from 45 million head) in 2012. 
Figure 10: Slaughtering capacity and actual slaughter 
numbers for selected companies in 2011
SLAUGHTER 
CAPACITY BY THE 
END OF 2011 IN 
MILLION HEADS
ESTIMATED ACTUAL 
SLAUGHTER 
NUMBERS IN 2011 IN 
MILLION HEAD
Shineway 25 10
Yurun 46 15
People’s Food 20 8
Shunxin Agriculture 3 2
Source: Company data, Rabobank estimates, 2012
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III .  CHINA’S PORK 
A ND LI V ESTOCK 
DE V ELOPMEN T 
STR ATEGY:  MORE 
ME AT,  MODERN 
ME AT,  SA FE ME AT
While development economists, supporters of agricultural 
industrialization and even conventional understandings 
would have it that the megafarm phenomenon in China’s 
livestock sector is a natural and inevitable step in the 
process of modernization, each instance of industrializa-
tion has its own historical, social and ecological context. In 
China, the state has played a central role in transforming 
pig production. Development of the livestock sector has 
been motivated by the government’s drive to increase 
meat production, to create protein-rich “modern” diets for 
urban middle and upper class consumers in particular, and 
most recently, to address public concerns over food safety 
This section outlines some of the assumptions and priori-
ties of Chinese policymakers that led them to aggressively 
promote a U.S.-like industrial hog model, despite the clear 
social and environmental challenges it creates. 
Why more pork?
Of all agrifood sectors, pork is perhaps the most distinc-
tively Chinese—the centuries-long practice of household 
pig raising is evident even in language. For example, in 
Mandarin Chinese, the general word for meat (rou) refers 
to pork,43 and the Chinese character for home and family, 
家( jia), was created some 3,500 years ago by adding the 
roof radical to the pig radical, or more figuratively, by 
putting a roof over a pig’s head.44 
This cultural and historical significance is key to under-
standing why, in the push to increase meat production 
throughout the reform era, pork has been a central focus: 
simply put, consumers want pork. While it is important 
to note that demand for other meats is rising—and in fact 
the share of pork in total meat consumption has fallen as 
others have grown (from 94.1 percent of all meat in 2000 to 
64.7 percent in 2005)45—pork remains the principal meat in 
the Chinese agrifood system.
An important driver for increasing meat production in 
general and pork production in particular is the state’s 
need for legitimacy and public trust. Meat in contem-
porary China signifies progress against a backdrop of 
scarcity, and a progress that the government is keen to 
count among its modern accomplishments. The legacy of 
the Cultural Revolution and experiences of food rationing 
inform the state’s reform era focus on increasing pork 
production and consumption. Even though farmers for 
centuries ate meat only once or twice a year for holidays 
and special occasions, meat rationing impacted the diets 
of virtually all Chinese people, changing popular notions 
and expectations of the frequency and amount of meat 
consumption. The government has responded by trying to 
satisfy the notion of “eating meat in revenge” (against past 
scarcity), and to legitimize the state for its role in creating a 
bountiful agrifood system that satisfies consumer desires 
and demands. As an agribusiness executive in Shanghai 
put it, “Meat [pork] signifies wealth. The more money you 
have, the more meat [pork] you will eat.” And the more 
meat people are eating, the more secure officials can feel 
that the agri-food system is modernizing along the lines 
of countries like the U.S. 
“Let them eat pork”
While meat consumption is increasing across the board in 
China, it is urban-focused and anything but even. As meat 
moves to the center of urban middle class consumption, 
grain continues to be the foundation of rural diets. Figure 
11 illustrates these differences.
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Reproduced from Rabobank, 2012, pg. 3.
Figure 11: Per capita purchase of key food products by 
various income groups in China
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The urban focus in meat consumption reflects other inequal-
ities in China today. Before economic reforms, China was 
one of the most egalitarian countries in the world. Today, 
with a Gini coefficient (statistical measurement of income 
inequality) of 0.61,46 it is among the most unequal. Though 
the government has been celebrated for lifting millions 
of people out of poverty in the reform era, inequalities are 
growing with increasing rural unrest. 
According to China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the 2011 
urban-to-rural income ratio was 3 to 1. In order to avoid 
further social conflict, central authorities have made closing 
the income gap a political priority. They have implemented 
a number of measures aimed at increasing income levels for 
farmers and migrant workers in particular: these include 
direct farm subsidies, vertical integration and contract 
farming, abolishing agricultural taxes and adjusting the 
legal minimum wage for workers at least once every two 
years. According to the State Council, the annual rural 
income growth rate remained higher than six percent from 
2006 to 2011, but scholars find that these increases resulted 
primarily from migrant labor remittances, rather than 
from the success of other government measures.47
Metropolitan consumers spend almost three times 
as much money on food, while rural residents spend a 
larger share of their income fulfilling basic dietary needs 
(44 percent of rural income, versus 38 percent of urban 
income). When food prices increase, therefore, the rural 
poor are hardest hit. As the central component of the 
Consumer Price Index, pork prices are particularly impor-
tant to state authorities as an important trace on inflation 
but also as a thing to be regulated to head off social unrest. 
Increasing pork production and pork availability is seen 
as a tool for addressing domestic political and economic 
issues and inequalities. Whether or not that tool is effec-
tive is a matter of contention. 
Food safety as a demand driver
At the same time that urban consumers in particular 
are eating more factory farmed meat, a number of food 
safety scandals have soured the protein party. According 
to a 2013 report from the Public Opinion Research Labo-
ratory and Crisis Management Center of Shanghai Jiao-
tong University, recent scandals involving melamine in 
milk (see IATP’s China’s Dairy Dilemma: The Evolution and 
Future Trends of China’s Dairy Industry), clenbuterol in pork, 
“instant chicken” cocktails of feed additives, and rat meat 
and bandages in dumplings have put food safety at the top 
of public concern.48 Consumers with enough disposable 
income are increasingly interested in buying food they can 
trust as being free from illegal additives and other unsafe 
or imposter materials. For urban consumers in a 2012 
study, the most trusted form of pork is from industrial 
production systems:49
From a Chinese consumer’s perspective, the 
industrial approach seems to represent values such 
as achievement and evolution, as well as quality and 
safety, since pig production is moving away from 
low-cost, low-quality, and low-safety family-scale 
systems (p. 443). 
The statement shows that Chinese urban consumers 
increasingly equate industrial farming as the symbol of 
modernization and development. It also demonstrates 
the widely popular urban misconception that smallholder 
farmers are to blame for China’s food safety scandals. 
This misconception needs to be critically evaluated in light 
of what we know about the practice of industrial livestock 
farming both in general, and in China in particular.50 A 
systemic analysis seems lacking given the rapid scaling up, 
rate and form of structural changes in the pork industry 
just in the last seven years. Another issue is a common 
lack of awareness about the costs of industrializing meat 
on public health and the environment, (see impact section 
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below). Antibiotic resistance is an often overlooked food 
safety threat even as half of China’s antibiotics are now 
fed to livestock, and superbugs are on the rise.51 Blaming 
smallholder farmers for the failings of pork safety protects 
the interests of agribusiness firms and shifts attention 
away from the industrial system, which is the true source 
of the problem. The case of ractopamine and other “lean 
meat powders” is another example (see Box 2).
At this stage, Chinese consumers respond to food safety 
scares by making dramatic shifts in consumption of one 
meat to another. For instance, the USDA’s Foreign Agri-
culture Service notes a rising demand for beef this year 
because of food safety scares in the pork and poultry 
sector. China’s “floating dead pig” incident where over 
10,000 pigs were found floating in Shanghai’s Huangpu 
River raised wide concerns. This combined with 44 deaths 
and 134 infections from avian flu in the poultry sector has 
had Chinese consumers switching to beef this year. USDA 
projects a 20 percent increase in beef imports (primarily 
from Australia) in 2014, due to this rising demand and 
good exchange rates.52 
I V.  DR AGON HE A DS, 
V ERTIC A L IN TEGR ATION 
A ND CON TR ACT FA R MING
 Producing meat and getting it to market are activities 
increasingly controlled by agribusiness firms. Starting in 
1998, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party identified vertical integration (chanyehua) as the 
principal mechanism for achieving agricultural moder-
nity, and appointed agribusiness firms called Dragon Head 
Enterprises (longtouqiye) as the vehicles to bring it about 
(Zhang & Donaldson, 2008). This statement from the 
Ministry of Agriculture succinctly describes the govern-
ment’s current approach to agricultural development, of 
which livestock development is a key part: “To support 
Box 2 : Food safety scandal…or business 
as usual?
Food safety issues, and especially residues in meat from 
illegal additives, are a serious and growing problem in 
China’s agrifood system—for instance the illegal use of clen-
buterol and its variants as “lean meat powder” (indicating 
the drugs’ ability to increase muscle in pigs at a rapid rate, 
making them leaner and heavier in a short amount of time). 
However, China’s use of these additives is not always as 
scandalous as depicted in the international press. In fact, 
some of these additives are problematically endemic in the 
global meat industry. Ractopamine is a case in point. Racto-
pamine is banned in China while it is one of a class of “lean 
meat powders,” legally fed to an estimated 60 to 80 percent 
of the pigs raised in the United States in order to speed the 
conversion of feed into lean pork. While the FDA approved 
ractopamine for use in pig farming in 1999, studies on its 
potential impact for human health are inconclusive, largely 
because they were conducted by the drug’s manufacturer, 
Elanco, a division of Eli Lily. Ractopamine mimics stress 
hormones, making the animals’ heart beat faster53 and 
raising their stress levels.
In the spring of 2011, a food safety scandal broke out 
in China when Shuanghui, the country’s largest meat 
processor, was found to be buying “lean meat powder”-fed 
pigs for its processing operations. The powders in question 
were clenbuterol and ractopamine, growth-promoting 
feed additives developed by firms in the U.S., and used in 
U.S. industrial livestock systems since the early 1980s. Both 
of these additives had been banned for use in China since 
2002, but in 2011, in the wake of the Shuanghui scandal, 
their production and sale was also banned.54
Why were these “lean meat powders” being produced and 
sold in China if their use was illegal there? Clearly some of 
the powders found their way into pig feed inside China, but 
more than just an instance of illegal activity or a domestic 
black market, these additives are produced for export. 
While clenbuterol has been broadly banned, ractopamine 
is still allowed for use in 26 countries including the United 
States, Brazil, Australia, Canada, Mexico, the Philippines,and 
others.55 Controversially, ractopamine was also narrowly 
accepted under Codex Alimentarius by two votes. In July 
2012, this United Nations commission approved international 
standards for ractopamine residues, which the European 
Union strongly and vocally opposed.56 China, the Russian 
Federation, India, Turkey and others joined the EU’s opposi-
tion, calling for an all-out ban of the additive, and reaffirming 
bans on ractopamine-fed meat imports. But according to 
insiders present at the negotiations, the U.S. government 
backed by the meat industry exerted considerable pressure 
on smaller nations to oppose the ban and succeeded.
This issue is currently playing out in the Shuanghui-Smith-
field deal. Pharmaceutical company Eli Lily sells ractopa-
mine under the trade name Paylean in the United States; it 
is a widely and commonly used feed additive in the U.S. But 
in order to create the Shuanghui-Smithfield pork channel 
to China, Smithfield needs to produce ractopamine-free 
meat. In order to prepare for the take-over, the company 
vowed to be 50 percent ractopamine-free by June 1, 2013.57 
In this case, concerns about China’s poor food safety record 
affecting the U.S. food system seem woefully misplaced. 
Sometimes a food safety scandal in China is business as 
usual in the United States.
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industrialization is to support agriculture, to support 
enterprises is to support farmers.” Put another way, the 
model is intended to replace small-scale farming with 
agribusiness, local markets with contract farming and 
dispersed production with vertical integration. According 
to the State Council in 2012, Dragon Heads are “the major 
agents for constructing a modern agricultural system, and 
are the key to advancing agricultural industrialization.”58 
And they do not have to be state-owned. They are, 
not like ordinary commercial enterprises: they are 
responsible for opening up new markets, innovating 
in science and technology, driving farm households, 
and advancing regional economic development. 
They are capable of driving agricultural and village 
economic restructuring, driving commodity 
production development, promoting increased 
efficiency, and increasing farmers’ income.59
According to official statistics, in 2011, the Dragon Head 
Enterprise-led production model was operating on 60 
percent of the country’s crop production area, and covered 
70 percent of livestock (pigs and poultry) and 80 percent 
of aquaculture production (see Box 3). Combined sales 
revenue of Dragon Heads in 2011 was 5.7 trillion RMB ($917 
billion), and their products accounted for one-third of the 
country’s supply of farm produce and processed foods, and 
two-thirds of the average food basket in major cities.60 
While scholars argue that official statistics in China are 
not the most reliable measures of reality, even if these 
numbers are inflated to some degree, they demonstrate 
the scale and trajectory of Dragon Head power. 
The sections that follow detail the definition and opera-
tion of Dragon Head Enterprises, the Chinese conception 
of vertical integration, and the “company and farm” model 
of contract farming. Together, they provide a sketch of 
China’s livestock development model, its major actors, 
relations and logics of operation.
Dragon Head Enterprises:61 
Agribusiness firms take the lead
In Chinese culture, the dragon is a symbol of both the Han 
majority and the Chinese nation as a whole, and is thought 
to embody power, wisdom and auspiciousness. Dragon 
Head Enterprises (DHEs) first appeared in central policy in 
199862 when authorities proclaimed that lead firms would 
be the key for modernizing China’s agriculture by inte-
grating and scaling-up production.63 The name “Dragon 
Head Enterprise” comes from the dragon dance, a ceremo-
nial dance in China, which dates to the Han Dynasty, and 
continues to be a fundamental performance at festivals 
and holiday celebrations.64 In the dance, one performer 
wears a fierce dragon head, leading others who are bent 
over each other to make up the dragon’s body, in a long line 
of coordinated and undulating movement. Inspired by this 
imagery and meaning, central authorities empower DHEs 
to don the “head” of the dragon in order to guide masses 
of farmers on the path of industrialization, and to lead the 
nation on the path of modernization. 
With each set of government pronouncements about 
DHEs, state support for agribusiness grows, as does 
the power of these firms in restructuring agricultural 
economies, production systems, and livelihoods. The new 
Dragon Head Association established in November 2012 in 
particular provides an institutionalized space for state and 
private enterprise to work together in the construction 
of an integrated and increasingly consolidated domestic 
agribusiness sector. 
The Dragon Head label entitles a company to govern-
ment programs that subsidize these responsibilities, and 
to bragging rights as a lead firm, which can translate into 
enhanced legitimacy as a trustworthy company in the 
market. Today central, provincial and local governments 
can bestow Dragon Head status, with national-level 
designation being the most honorable and profitable.65
Figure 12 provides a snapshot of the type of subsidies the 
State has given to the top pork processing DHEs:66
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Figure 12: A snapshot of the type of subsidies the State has given to the top pork processing DHEs65
KEY 
PLAYERS
2011 SUBSIDIES 
(MILLION 
RMB)
2011 SUBSIDY 
TO NET PROFIT 
(PERCENT)
2010 SUBSIDIES 
(MILLION RMB)
2010 SUBSIDY 
TO NET PROFIT 
(PERCENT)
TYPES OF SUBSIDIES
Yurun 529.85 36.33 606.63 26.77 6. Merger & acquisition fund from government
7. Supporting fund of Agro-food industrialisation
8. Subsidy on banking loan interest
New 
Wellful
17.1 23.73 79.98 541.39 1. Live hog reserve subsidy
2. Agricultural, light industry and textile products trade 
promotion subsidy
3. Special agricultural subsidy
4. Live hog farm and environment-friendly construction 
subsidy
5. Live hog science and technology subsidy
6. Subsidy on sow raising
7. Frozen pork reserve subsidy
8. Project management subsidy
9. Foreign trade development promotion subsidy
Shineway 120.47 15.94 33.01 2.49 1. Local government financial support
Shunxin 
Agro
0.31 0.1 5.14 1.94 1. Dazhou commerce business information subsidy
2. Dazhou project supporting fund
3. Subsidy on hog breeding
Gaojin 7.58 11.82 43.33 N/A 1. Live hog slaughtering subsidy
2. Capacity expansion subsidy
3. Live hog processing line subsidy
4. Live hog industrial processing improvement subsidy
Chuying 4.21 0.98 10.19 8.29 1. Purchased breeding pigs subsidy
2. Housing construction subsidy
3. Advanced entrepreneurship subsidy
4. Live hog reserve subsidy
Reproduced from Rabobank, 2012, pg. 15.
To become a Dragon Head, a firm must meet a set of 
operational, financial, and farm integration criteria.67 
Operationally, a company must primarily function as 
an agricultural processor, distributor or intermediary, 
with processing and distribution accounting for at least 
70 percent of the value of the company’s products. Also, 
it must have legal standing as a state-owned or private 
enterprise, a group or corporation, a China-foreign joint-
venture, or a wholly foreign owned enterprise.68
Financially, the state sets minimum asset and sales thresh-
olds for attaining Dragon Head status,69 depending on a firm’s 
location in the country and operational type. Minimums for 
processors and distributors by region are as follows:
Figure 13: Minimum for Dragon Head status
ASSETS MINIMUM SALES MINIMUM
East
150 million RMB  
($24 million)
200 million RMB  
($32 million)
Data Source: 2003 and 2010 “Provisional Measures” policy 
documents.
Figure 13: Minimum for Dragon Head status
ASSETS MINIMUM SALES MINIMUM
Central
100 million RMB  
($16 million)
130 million RMB  
($21 million)
West
50 million RMB  
($8 million)
60 million RMB  
($9.7 million)
Data Source: 2003 and 2010 “Provisional Measures” policy 
documents.
DHEs link to farmers
In order to fulfill the rural development responsibilities 
that come along with the Dragon Head name, lead firms 
must have a strong “interest coupling mechanism” (liyi 
lianjie fangshi) for integrating farm households into their 
operations and markets. Mechanisms include contracts, 
shareholding and cooperation with rural households, 
and 70 percent of the primary products for the company’s 
processing and distribution must come through these 
arrangements. Firms in the East are required to inte-
grate 4,000 households, those in the Central region, 3,500 
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households, and in the West, 1,500 households. Whether or 
not these minimum thresholds are met, and more impor-
tantly, whether or not they are beneficial to farm house-
holds, are matters of debate.70
Measures to promote DHEs since the turn of the 21st 
Century fall under two broad categories. First, there 
are supports for firms directly involved in agricultural 
processing and distribution. In the period from 2000 to 
2005, the central government spent 11.9 billion RMB 
($1.9 billion USD) subsidizing construction and opera-
tion expenses of these large-scale, national-level Dragon 
Heads.71 In addition to direct payments, authorities also 
offer tax exemptions and reductions, export tax rebates, 
discount loans for export-oriented products, and access 
to special loans with little or no interest.72 The second 
category of policy supports are to subsidize wholesalers 
and agriculture-related sectors, such as companies 
that specialize in frozen pork storage, product research 
and development, and sewage management.73 Support 
programs for these firms are similarly based in financial, 
fiscal and tax policies. 
As a result of concentrated state support and industry 
cooperation, lead firms have expanded both in number 
and in the scope of agrifood system ownership and 
control. According to official figures for 2011,74 China had 
more than 280,000 enterprises engaged in agricultural 
industrialization, including 110,000 officially designated 
national-level Dragon Heads. These firms were working 
with 110 million rural households, following the model of 
“radiation-driven” (fushe daidong) farming, in which tech-
nology, information and market opportunities radiate to 
farmers through their relationships with Dragon Heads. 
Box 3: Dragon Head Enterprises (DHE) 
at a glance: 201175
Dragon Head Enterprises (DHEs) at a Glance: 2011
Number of national-level DHEs 110,000
Number of rural households engaged 
with DHEs
110 million
Sales revenue of all national-level 
DHEs
5.7 trillion RMB 
($917 billion USD)
Share of production under Dragon Head “radiation-
driven” farming
 Crop area 60%
 Livestock production (pigs & chicken) 70%
 Aquaculture 80%
 Total farm produce and processed 
foods
1/3
 Average food basket in major cities 2/3
Dragon Heads and the pork industry
The pork sector illustrates the prevalence of domestic 
agribusiness firms, and the success of state support for 
agricultural processors in particular. Based on 2011 sales 
data, of the top 10 pork processing firms, all but one (90 
percent) were Dragon Head Enterprises. Lead enterprises 
accounted for 80 percent of the top 10 firms in pork slaugh-
terhouses and retailing. While processors are the focus of 
Dragon Head policy support, based on the idea that these 
firms can most efficiently coordinate the agrifood system 
for modernization, companies involved in production are 
also increasingly designated as leaders. Sixty percent of 
the top 10 pig breeding and production firms were Dragon 
Heads in 2011. 
Figure 14 illustrates the dominant presence of Dragon 
Heads in the pork sector, as well as the relative absence 
of foreign firms.76 Across the sector, only two firms have 
foreign involvement, though not in the typical joint-
venture fashion. First, in 2006, Goldman Sachs bought a 
10 percent share in the now well-known Shuanghui Group 
(Shuanghui jituan), and then sold half of those shares in 
2009 to CDH Investments, a Chinese private equity fund.77 
Shuanghui International, the entity that is buying Smith-
field Foods, is an international holding company that 
also owns the Shuanghui Group, a former state-owned 
enterprise. 
Second, Jinluo Meat Products (Linyi Xincheng Jinluo 
rouzhipin youxiangongsi) was founded by a medical doctor, 
a business entrepreneur, and an officer of the planning 
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department of the Linyi Industrial Bureau in Linyi City, 
Shandong Province in the early 1990s. The three Chinese 
co-founders incorporated the company first in the British 
Virgin Islands, and later in Bermuda to form People’s Food 
Holdings Limited as a conglomerate.78 So while Jinluo is a 
wholly foreign owned firm, its origins are in China, and 
it is an officially recognized Dragon Head Enterprise. It is 
also one of the country’s top three pork processors.
By way of comparison, chicken is most similar to the pork 
sector in terms of domestic ownership and control, as in 
Figure 14. All of the top firms in chicken slaughter and 
retailing are Dragon Heads, and two have foreign joint 
ventures. Xinchang Foods (Shandong Taisen Xinchang 
shipin youxiangongsi), the tenth largest chicken processor 
and eighth chicken retailer, established a joint venture 
with Tyson Foods in 2009, in which Tyson took a 60 
percent share of the company’s assets.79 Beijing Dafa Chia 
Tai (Beijing Dafa Zhengda youxiangongsi), the sixth largest 
chicken processor and number one chicken retailer, is a 
joint venture with the CP Group of Thailand (referred to as 
the Chai Tai Group in China). 
Figure 14: Share of Dragon Head Enterprises and foreign 
firms in select agricultural sectors, 2011.
DRAGON HEADS 
ENTERPRISES AS A 
% OF TOP 10 FIRMS 
BY SALES IN 2011
FOREIGN FIRMS 
AS A % OF TOP 10 
FIRMS BY SALES 
IN 2011
Pig Breeding 60 0
Pig Production 60 0
Pig Slaughter 80 10
Pork Processing 90 10
Pork Retail Brands 80 10
Chicken Processing 100 20
Chicken Retail Brands 100 20
Rice Processing 80 10
Rice Retail Brands 60 0
Wheat Processing 50 20
Wheat Retail Brands 40 0
Maize Processing 10 30
Maize Retail Brands 20 20
Soybean Oil 
Processing
30 60
Soybean Oil Retail 
Brands
30 20
Soybean Meal 
Importers
0 0
Soybean Meal 
Exporters
10 80*
Soybean Importers 10 30
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DRAGON HEADS 
ENTERPRISES AS A 
% OF TOP 10 FIRMS 
BY SALES IN 2011
FOREIGN FIRMS 
AS A % OF TOP 10 
FIRMS BY SALES 
IN 2011
Feed Processing 50 40
*This figure is out of 5 companies, rather than 10.
Reproduced from: Schneider, M. (2012). Poor rural and agricul-
tural livelihoods: Discourses, policies, Dragon Head Enterprises, 
vertical integration, and contract farming in China. Beijing: 
Oxfam, Hong Kong.
Vertical integration with Chinese 
characteristics
Dragon Head Enterprises are intended to fulfill their 
rural development role by vertically integrating agri-
cultural production through relationships with farmers. 
Vertical integration in the Chinese sense means coordi-
nated production, processing, distribution, and sales of 
agricultural products, or in the language of Sinograin, 
the China Grain Reserves Corporation,80 “Constructing 
the industrial chain from field to dining table” ( jianshe 
cong tianjian dao canzhuo chanyelian). It is a form of “value 
chain integration,” with farmers at one end of the chain 
producing primary products (like pigs), and Dragon Heads 
Enterprises at the other end processing and selling value-
added commodities on local, national and increasingly 
international markets (like sausages and hams). Outside 
of China, vertical integration typically describes the 
activity of a single firm, and the extent to which it owns 
and controls several stages in a commodity chain. In the 
Chinese policy context, vertical integration refers to two 
parallel processes at broader scales: first, regional scaling-
up of production, and second, integration of cultivation 
with processing and marketing at the level of a firm or 
more likely of the whole commodity system.81 The regional 
concentration of pork production to service metropolitan 
areas on the East coast is an example of Chinese-style 
vertical integration.
Chinese scholars and policymakers celebrate the pork 
sector as a model of “modern agriculture,” and a shining 
example of successful and continuing vertical integra-
tion.82 In the pork sector, vertical integration is not only 
of the Chinese variety as detailed above, but also increas-
ingly reflects the way the concept is used outside of 
China to connote the activities of single firms. William 
Heffernan states that, “vertical integration occurs when 
a firm increases ownership and control of a number of 
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stages in a commodity system.”83 Figure 15 illustrates this 
kind of firm-level vertical integration, including the pres-
ence of Dragon Heads, among the top 10 firms in different 
stages of pork production and processing. 
Three firms stand out as being on “the cutting edge of 
modernization” in terms of management, production and 
marketing in the pork sector, and as vertical integration 
leaders. Over the past decade, Shuanghui, Jinluo, and Yurun 
have shared the spotlight in pork processing and sales, 
vying for the number one position year after year.84 Their 
combined annual sales in 2011 were 115.6 billion RMB 
($19 billion), which accounted for 68 percent of total sales 
for the top 10 pork processors. Combined annual profits 
were 6 billion RMB ($965 million), or 86 percent of total 
profits for the top 10 pork processors. Together, these three 
firms employ 119,000 employees, and are concentrating 
market share in pork processing and sales.85 Shuanghui 
is a formerly state-owned enterprise, Jinluo is Chinese-
founded and British Virgin Islands incorporated, and 
Yurun is a private firm founded in Nanjing. All three are 
Dragon Heads.
Figure 15: Vertical integration among the top 10 firms in China’s pork industry. 
PIG BREEDERS PIG PRODUCERS PORK 
SLAUGHTER
PORK 
PROCESSORS
PORK RETAILERS
1 Xunxin* Wens* Jinluo* Shuanghui* Shuanghui*
2 Tieji Lishi Chuming* Yurun* Jinluo* Jinluo*
3 Fuxin Bohiya Shuanghui* Zhucheng* Yurun*
4 Zhengyang 
ZhuMei
Neixiang Muyuan Zhiyuan Zhongpin* Gaojin*
5 Beijing Capital 
Ag*
Xinwufeng* Pengcheng* Delisi* Tangren Shen*
6 Zhongshan 
Baihe
Shuangge* Gaojin* Jinluo* Meihao*
7 Shuangge* Tianzhong* Zhongpin* Beixu* Delisi*
8 Xinwufeng* Huangjinxiang* Panyu Furun* Ke’erqin Cattle*
9 Chanjiang* Zhongshan 
Baihe
Delisi* Weifang Legang* Chundu
10 Tianzhong* Luhuan Jingyan* Jitailong Qianxihe
Firms that rank in the top 10 of more than one stage of production (vertically integrated) appear in 
bold. Dragon Head are indicated by *. 
Reproduced from: Schneider, M. (2012). Poor rural and agricultural livelihoods: Discourses, policies, 
Dragon Head Enterprises, vertical integration, and contract farming in China. Beijing: Oxfam, Hong 
Kong.
Vertical integration and contract 
farming: The “company and farm” model
Contract farming between Dragon Head Enterprises and 
smallholder farmers is the state’s primary strategy for 
vertical integration and coordinating rural production 
along market-based lines with a goal to also improve rural 
livelihoods.86 Authorities formalized contract farming 
and the “company and farm” (gongsi + nonghu) model87 
for linking Dragon Head processors with rural primary 
producers in 2003.88 The model is similar to livestock 
contracting schemes used in the U.S. and elsewhere, and 
led by firms like Tyson and Smithfield. 
China’s “company and farm” model originated in a chicken 
start-up operation in the early 1980s when Wen Beiying, 
an entrepreneurial farmer, contracted with other farmers 
in an effort to scale-up and standardize production for 
his broiler processing and sales business. Wen’s company 
supplied baby chickens, feed, veterinary supplies, tech-
nical training, and services to nearby farm households, and 
farmers in turn provided the labor and facilities for raising 
chickens. The company 
offered “protective prices” to 
ensure delivery and farmer 
loyalty, and to maintain 
a constant supply of birds 
for processing.89 This small 
start-up company is now one 
of the largest domestic agri-
business firms in China—the 
Guangdong Wens Foodstuffs 
Group (Wens)—and this early 
form of contract farming is 
now widely used across the 
country and across agricul-
tural sectors.90 The “company 
and farm” model is perhaps 
the clearest expression 
of how the state proposes 
managing farmers and agri-
cultural development, while 
promoting the domestic 
agribusiness sector. 
By official estimates, the 
model has been quite successful. The Ministry of Agricul-
ture established the office for Vertical Integration of Agri-
culture (nongye chanyehua bangongshi) in the mid-1990s, 
with branch offices now in every province. The Office issued 
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its first full-length report in April of 2008 (Zhongguo nongye 
chanyehua fazhan baogao), which stated that by 2005, fully 
one half of China’s cultivated area and 36 percent of farm 
households (about 87 million) had been vertically integrated, 
either by lead firms, specialized co-ops (and other brokerage 
organizations), or specialty markets.91 Vertical integration 
has penetrated agricultural production even further today: 
official statistics show that products from Dragon Head 
Enterprises accounted for one-third of all farm produce 
and two-thirds of the average food basket in major cities 
in 2011, including 70 percent of pork and chicken produc-
tion.92 When China’s officials announce these figures, they 
are reporting on vertical integration that takes the form 
of contract farming, the “company and farm” model, and 
farm integration with Dragon Heads. These relations take 
on a myriad of forms in various stages of production and 
processing, in the pork sector and more broadly.
In addition to vertical integration of the Chinese and U.S. 
varieties, the livestock industry is also consolidating 
horizontally and globally, as expressed in the Shuan-
ghui-Smithfield deal. Again, Shuanghui is an exemplar 
of China’s model. As a highly capitalized and invested 
Dragon Head Enterprise, Shuanghui is successful both at 
home and abroad, reflecting the government’s focus on 
constructing a robust domestic agribusiness sector, while 
at the same time supporting those firms to become inter-
nationally competitive. The Smithfield acquisition signals 
a new era of global consolidation in which a Chinese firm 
is the buyer (or, rather, an internationally held corpora-
tion with Chinese roots), and subsequently, controls the 
sale and distribution of products throughout the Chinese 
agrifood system. 
Impacts of this system on small 
livestock producers
Small producers raising a small number of animals on 
household-based feed and catering to their local commu-
nities are systematically being driven out as we have seen 
above. While the Chinese government is stressing the 
formation of farmers cooperatives and contractual arrange-
ments with DHEs, these are often not in the best interests 
of smallholder farmers. For instance, prohibitively high 
costs of participation in contracts with large firms,93 unat-
tainable market standards,94 lack of farm labour,95 declining 
soil and water quality for production,96 and the preferences 
of firms to contract with larger farms97 create often insur-
mountable barriers for smallholders to enter into contract 
relationships. These can be thought of as “problems of 
exclusion.” On the other hand, farmers also face challenges 
if and when they enter into contract relationships. Firms 
set the terms of contracts, and have a monopoly on price-
setting, which reduces smallholder bargaining power, and 
often makes rural households dependent on firms as market 
outlets when other options disappear or become unviable. 
Smallholders can become dependent on contracts and stop 
growing food for home use,98 they frequently lose decision-
making power,99 often lack legal understanding which 
opens them up to being taken advantage of by firms, and 
they bear most of the risk in contract relationships when 
prices fall.100 These can be thought of as “problems of inclu-
sion.” In both cases, the deck, so to speak, is stacked against 
the small-scale farm household.
This kind of transformation, and the problems associated 
with it, are not unique to China. The U.S. has already lost 
the majority of its independent pig farmers, and those who 
remain are beholden to a few powerful meat companies. 
This seems to be the direction that China’s pork industry 
is taking, though with greater difficulty given the large 
number and dispersed nature of smallholder farmers and 
small-scale meat processing companies in the country.
V.  FOREIGN FIRMS A ND 
GLOBA L CONSOLIDATION 
IN CHINA’S PORK 
INDUSTRY
Despite the largely domestic nature of production, 
processing, sales and ownership in China’s pork industry, 
foreign firms also play a role. From operating through 
commercial markets and contracts, to forming joint 
ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries, international 
involvement takes various forms in many different 
sectors. For instance, all of the world’s leading grain 
traders (ABCD, or Archer Daniels Midland with Wilmar, 
Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus) operate in China as 
part of the feed supply chain (see IATP’s The Need for Feed: 
China’s Demand for Industrialized Meat and Its Impacts in this 
series and 2011 IATP report, Feeding China’s Pigs). 
Livestock genetics also have significant international 
connections. PIC (the Pig Improvement Company), the 
self-proclaimed “international leader in providing geneti-
cally superior pig breeding stock and technical support for 
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maximizing genetic potential to the global pork chain,”101 
established an office in Shanghai in 1996 to coordinate its 
China presence. Another world leader in pig breeding, 
HENDRIX GENETICS, operates as HYPOR CHINA. The 
company (Hypor at the time, before the company’s merger 
with Hendrix) began shipping pigs to China in 2004. It 
now has regional offices in Beijing, Shandong and Wuning, 
and has established several joint venture operations to 
supply local markets and to manage imports from its other 
production centers.102
The global consolidation of pork genetics into just a few 
world-dominant firms is mirrored in the simplification 
of China’s rich genetic diversity into just a few breeds of 
imported pigs. A Ministry of Agriculture official esti-
mates that 90 percent of China’s pork is produced from 
exotics, predominantly Duroc, Landrace and Yorkshire 
swine. Firms like PIC and Hendrix-Hypor have been 
successful not only in selling their breeding stock, but also 
in selling the industrial production model, which is based 
on a narrow range of “improved” pigs developed to survive 
in confinement. The prolificacy, agroecological value, and 
flavorful pork associated with China’s indigenous pigs 
suggest this model may not be all it’s cracked up to be.
International firms are also actively involved in supplying 
China’s pork industry with technologies and equipment. 
For example, BIG DUTCHMAN, the top livestock equipment 
dealer worldwide, has regional sales offices in Beijing and 
Tianjin.103 In April 2013, Big Dutchman signed a partner-
ship contract with Jiayuguan CP Modern Agriculture and 
Husbandry Industrial Farmers Cooperation Organiza-
tion in Gansu Province to supply feeding equipment for a 
46.4 million RMB ($7.58 million USD) pilot pig production 
project.104 The company is also involved in chicken produc-
tion and meat sales in China.
Photo: Big Dutchman at VIV China (trade show), Beijing, 2010. (Mindi 
Schneider)
In addition to foreign firms operating predominantly as 
suppliers in China’s pork industry, leading international 
meat companies also have direct connections to China, 
with processing operations on the ground. The remainder 
of this section summarizes the China operations of the 
world’s top ten protein processors in 2011,105 in the order of 
their global standing.106
JBS is the world’s largest protein processor with 140 
production facilities worldwide. Headquartered in the 
United States, JBS sells pork and most of its beef under the 
Swift label, and chicken largely under its Pilgrim’s label. 
The company has production and processing operations in 
China, but the primary connection is through China as an 
export market for pork and chicken. The company website 
is www.jbssa.com.
TYSON FOODS, the second-largest protein processor 
worldwide, has extensive operations in China, particu-
larly in Shandong Province and in the area surrounding 
Shanghai. In 2001, Tyson International Holdings formed a 
joint venture with Shandong Zhucheng Waimai to form a 
chicken processing operation called Shandong Tyson Dalong 
Foods. In 2011, after initiating a joint venture in Shan-
dong Province with three poultry plants in 2009, Tyson 
Foods assumed full ownership of Tyson Rizhao and Tyson 
Weifang. The former is a fully integrated poultry complex, 
and the latter is a partially integrated chicken operation 
that produces for exports to Korea and Japan. Outside of 
Shanghai, Jiangsu Tyson Foods was founded in 2008 as a 
wholly-owned, fully integrated poultry complex. Tyson 
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Nantong is a chicken production and processing facility 
focused on servicing the Chinese market. The company 
website is www.tysonfoods.com.
CARGILL, also based in the U.S., is the world’s third-largest 
meat processor. Cargill has more than 7,000 employees 
and operations in 52 locations in China. In 1988, Shandong-
Cargill Ltd. was formed as a $10 million joint venture with 
the People’s Republic for cottonseed crushing, and in 2009, 
Cargill purchased the Yangjiang Port in southern China 
for its grain importing and exporting operations. The firm 
initiated an integrated poultry complex in Anhui Province 
in 2012 that will reach full production in 2015. It also has 
connections to China’s dairy industry through relations 
with Mengniu. More generally, Cargill operates in China 
in animal nutrition, animal protein, trade and processing 
of agricultural products, food ingredients, finance and risk 
management, and industrial operations. The company 
website is www.cargill.com. Cargill China is at www.
cargill.com.cn/en/.
BRASIL FOODS is number four on the list. Formed in 2009 
through a merger of two major Brazilian food companies, 
the company operates in China through the Dah Chong 
Hong Limited joint venture, and the Rising Star Food Company 
joint venture. Brasil Foods distributes its Sadia and 
Perdix brands of processed foods (including proteins) to 
Hong Kong, Macao, and Continental China. The company 
website is www.brasilfoods.com.
Dutch-headquartered VION is the fifth-largest protein 
processor. It has two offices in China, one in Shanghai and 
one in Hong Kong. The company produces meat products 
and food and feedstuffs. The company also exports to 
China. The company website is www.vionfoodgroup.com.
MARFRIG ALIMENTOS, Brazil’s third-largest food processor, 
is the world’s sixth-largest protein processor. It operates in 
China under the brand name Keystone, formed from two 
joint ventures, one as COFCO Keystone Foods Supply Chain 
Investment Company and the other as Keystone-Chinwhiz 
Poultry Vertical Integration. The former deals in distribu-
tion and the latter in poultry production and processing. 
Keystone’s focus is on the global food service industry, 
with McDonalds as the company’s main client. The firm 
plans to increase its business with YUM brands, KFC, 
Subway, Chipotle and others, and particularly in China. 
The company website is www.marfrig.com.br.
The current seventh largest protein processor is SMITH-
FIELD FOODS. By the end of 2013, Smithfield will have 
become part of Shuanghui.
Japan’s NIPPON MEATS is number eight on the global list. The 
company has a trading firm called Nippon Food (Shanghai) 
for the sale of fresh meat. It sells processed foods through 
Shandong Rilong Foodstuffs, and has production and sales 
operations through Tianjin Longhai Foods, Weihai Nippon 
Shukuhin, Yantai Baochang Foodstuffs, and Shandong New 
Japanese Foods. It also has Nippon Meat Packer Inc. in Taiwan. 
The company website is www.nipponham.co.jp/eng.
DANISH CROWN is number nine on the list. It operates 
two offices in China under ESS-FOOD, one in Dalian and 
one in Qingdao. ESS-FOOD is a wholly-owned company 
operating in the meat sector. The company website is 
www.danishcrown.com.
Number ten on the list of the world’s largest protein 
processors is HORMEL FOODS, headquartered in the U.S. 
In 1994, Hormel entered into a joint venture with Beijing 
General Corporation of Agriculture, Industry Commerce to 
form Beijing Hormel Foods. The company operates in manu-
facturing, sales, marketing and distribution of chilled 
processed meat products. Shanghai Hormel Foods was the 
company’s second China joint venture, initiated in 1995 to 
sell chilled processed meats in Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen. The company website is www.hormel.com.
The success of foreign firms in bringing their products and 
models to China’s pork industry—with the help of govern-
ment policies and joint ventures—is evidenced in the coun-
try’s rural and urban areas. Urban retail food markets in 
particular are replete with packaged and processed pork 
products, some bearing the brand of Chinese firms, others 
international trademarks. Agricultural expos and trade 
shows are stocked and staffed with international firms 
selling everything from farrowing crates, to micronu-
trient feed additives, to dummy sows for artificial insemi-
nation programs. Pork production and breeding centers 
of the large-scale industrial kind are popping up outside 
of major and midsized cities in suburban and peri-urban 
areas. Given that they are constructed of the same mate-
rials, drawn from the same blueprints, and erected out of 
the same notion of modern production as industrial farms 
everywhere, a CAFO in China looks like a CAFO in Iowa, 
though sometimes at a larger scale with more connected 
buildings. And in the countryside, the imprint of indus-
trial pork production—as both a homegrown and imported 
model—is expressed in the relative absence of pigs on 
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smallholder farms, and perhaps in the steady decline of 
these farms themselves. The industrial model has no room 
for small-scale agroecological farming, or the farmers 
who practice it.
V I .  IMPACTS OF THE 
INDUSTRI A L LI V ESTOCK 
PRODUCTION MODEL
Chinese policymakers see the U.S. industrial pork produc-
tion model as the solution to China’s food safety problems. 
Their incentives to consolidate, scale up and standardize 
the industry are intended to increase production efficien-
cies and reduce food safety scandals. Yet it is precisely this 
system of factory farming (developed in the U.S. over 50 
years ago) that confines large numbers of animals together 
in restricted spaces and creates systems for fast animal 
growth and short meat-to-market times that has led to 
drastic environmental, public health and animal welfare 
problems in the U.S. It has led to the virtual disappear-
ance of extensive and sustainable farming systems run 
by independent family farmers to one of contractual labor 
where a few powerful meatpacking companies control the 
terms of trade and production. Moreover, the system has 
resulted in widespread land use–change in the U.S. and 
abroad, as staggering quantities of grains are fed to these 
large populations of animals, consuming fossil fuel energy, 
water and land—far more than humanity can withstand 
as global populations rise in an era of climate change. This 
section briefly outlines some of the most pressing impli-
cations of the industrial livestock production model. It is 
by no means exhaustive,107 but gives a sense of what is at 
stake for China, given the experience in the U.S.
Antibiotic resistance is a serious problem in the U.S. live-
stock industry, and increasingly, in China’s. In 2011, the U.S. 
used 29.9 million pounds (over 13 million kgs) of antibiotics 
in livestock production,108 accounting for up to 80 percent 
of the total volume of antibiotics sold in the country.109 The 
U.S. Government’s Center for Disease Control revealed 
that at least 23,000 Americans die every year because of 
antibiotic resistance as a result of the widespread overuse 
and abuse of these drugs. In 2008, China already produced 
210 million kg of antibiotics, nearly half of which was put 
to use in the livestock sector.110 “Superbugs” are emerging, 
compromising the ability of medicines to treat disease 
in both humans and other animals and presaging public 
health issues on a scale much larger than in the U.S. 
The U.S. government has thus far succumbed to the live-
stock industry lobbies, demonstrated in its failure to phase 
out and eventually ban the non-therapeutic use of antimi-
crobials in spite of repeated calls by health professionals 
and reputable commissions.111 Experts are calling on the 
U.S. to also do much more to create an effective disease 
monitoring and tracking system for antibiotic resistance. 
For Chinese officials, this problem is an even greater chal-
lenge given the sheer volume of the antibiotics used and 
China’s human and animal populations. 
Manure and its management is another profound chal-
lenge. The United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) estimates that livestock produce 335 million dry 
tons of manure each year. While there are some regulations 
in place to manage manure, these systems are riddled with 
problems for ecosystems and human health. From lagoons 
that leach excess nutrients into groundwater and soil, to 
the use of liquid manure as fertilizer for crops that runs off 
into surface waters, this manure is an important source of 
water and soil pollution and climate change. In addition to 
nitrogen and phosphorus, contaminants from industrial 
factory farms also include pesticides, antibiotics, antibi-
otic-resistant and disease-causing organisms, growth-
promoting hormones, heavy metals and other pathogens.112 
Production and storage of manure also releases air pollut-
ants including ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, endotoxins and 
“animal dander” (dead skin cells of animals).113 
The drastic impacts of industrial livestock farming in 
the U.S. stem from producing 9.8 billion food animals on 
the same land mass as China with a fraction of China’s 
human population. China’s total food animal numbers far 
surpass 10 billion given that pigs alone constitute nearly 
800 million. In February of 2010, the Chinese government 
released results of the first national pollution census. The 
most startling finding of this nearly three-year, 737 million 
RMB ($10 million USD) investigation was that agriculture 
today is a bigger source of pollution in China than industry. 
Researchers found that farming was responsible for 44 
percent of chemical oxygen demand (the main measure 
of organic compounds in water), 67 percent of phosphorus 
discharges, and 57 percent of nitrogen discharges into 
bodies of water.114 Manure from industrial livestock farms 
is the most important source of this pollution—in 2008 
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China’s livestock produced 4.8 billion tons of waste.115 As 
the livestock industry grows, so too will the amount and 
problems of manure.
Land, water and resource limitations are other impor-
tant factors that Chinese officials are trying to navigate, 
and that emerge as social and environmental problems. 
By most counts, China is land-and-water scarce in rela-
tion to the country’s 1.3 billion people. Industrial livestock 
production (including feed) intensifies this high-popula-
tion-limited-resource problem. From 2000 to 2006, water 
tables in the North China Plain fell by 61 percent as inten-
sive agriculture shifted to fragile Northeastern stretches 
of the country.116 This problem will only be exacerbated 
as the model Chinese policymakers believe is optimal for 
livestock production—the CAFO model—encroaches even 
further. Globally, it takes 576 gallons (2180 liters) of water 
to produce one pound (0.45 kg) of pork (compared to 1,799 
gallons for one pound of beef).117 In 2014, China is slated to 
produce nearly 55 million tons of pork alone. These figures 
raise fundamental questions about China’s ecological 
limits and the tradeoffs involved for China’s food security 
and its appetite for meat.
The Shuanghui-Smithfield deal from an environmental 
perspective is therefore also “a trade of water for waste.”118 
Increased Smithfield exports to China translate into more 
water polluted in the U.S. This externalizing of environ-
mental and other negative impacts of industrial livestock 
production has clearly been identified as one key reason to 
shift Chinese policy towards greater imports. However, 
the fact remains that Chinese demand in a business-
as-usual scenario is simply overwhelming compared to 
supply on the world market. The number of hogs slaugh-
tered by Smithfield (a quarter of U.S. slaughter capacity) 
in 2012 accounts for only three percent of China’s slaugh-
tered hogs.119 
Clearly, the environmental and health problems related 
to this production model are not new. The U.S., in spite 
of overwhelming evidence and numerous advocates for a 
transition away from so-called factory farming, continues 
to succumb to the interests of the livestock industry. 
Powerful corporate players have stymied one regulation 
after another in the area of public health, environment 
and even basic transparency of their farm operations. Can 
the Chinese state learn from U.S. failures? Will it have 
the foresight to re-assess the DHE incentives to scale-up 
this mode of production in the interest of public health, 
environment and resource scarcity instead? Will Chinese 
consumers who typically react strongly to food safety and 
security scares begin to see how the path of this industry 
is leading to more, not fewer threats? 
CONCLUSION
In important ways, China’s once diverse agricultural 
systems are being simplified, eroded and industrialized. 
Foreign firms play an important role in these changes, 
whether as sources of ideas and models, or as sources of 
the materials and supplies—the building blocks—of the 
system. But foreign firms are not the only influence and 
they are not the sole actors. Industrialization of meat 
production in China has been a priority of the state, 
growing from a need to bolster legitimacy by insuring 
availability of pork, and a belief that large-scale industrial 
production is the only way to achieve this goal quickly. 
This report has shown that in a system that was decen-
tralized in the late 1970s and early 1980s, state support has 
made Dragon Head Enterprises the leaders in producing, 
selling, and profiting from pork and agricultural products 
more generally. 
As these firms are becoming increasingly capitalized and 
invested, they are also becoming increasingly powerful 
in global agrifood markets. The Shuanghui acquisition of 
Smithfield Foods is but one example of this phenomenon; 
it is a profound example given the scale of the deal and the 
media attention it has garnered, but it is by no means an 
isolated incident. The central government adopted a set 
of policies in 2000 to encourage Chinese state and private 
firms to invest in operations and infrastructure abroad.120 
This “go out” (zou chuqu) strategy continues today, and is 
related to new forms of global consolidation in the pork 
industry, as well as to China’s much-reported land grabs 
(see IATP’s The Need for Feed: China’s Demand for Industrial-
ized Meat and Its Impacts). Firms like Beidahuang, COFCO 
(the China National Cereals, Oils, and Feedstuffs Corpora-
tion), the Chongqing Grain Group, the New Hope Group, 
the China National Agricultural Development Group, and 
others have all “gone out” for land, agricultural resources 
and/or other companies abroad.121 
The pork industry in China is massive, as are its implica-
tions for soil and water pollution, climate change, public 
health and rural livelihoods.122 But the industry in China 
is in many ways the same industry in the U.S. and else-
where, a fact that analyses and policies need to take into 
account. Critiques of China’s pork miracle must also be 
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critiques of the practices and structures of industrial 
livestock agriculture on the whole. At the same time, as 
Chinese domestic firms play ever more important roles in 
global markets, it seems likely that agribusiness politics 
in the future, both in China and on the world stage, will 
be increasingly Dragon-Headed. Understanding what is 
general and what is particular, and how the two influ-
ence one another, is crucial for understanding the rise of 
agribusiness with Chinese characteristics. It is also necessary 
for framing and implementing more just, sustainable and 
diverse agrifood systems that can reverse the damages 
wrought by decades of global agricultural industrializa-
tion. This, surely, is our most pressing task.
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